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8 April 1966

COMMUNIST CHINESE STRATEGY TOWARD SOUTH KOREA, JAPAN, AND TAIWAN (AN APPRAISAL - - 1965)

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Communist Chinese Strategy Toward South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan
(An Appraisal--1965)

by

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8 April 1966

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
SUMMARY	111
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE	3
The Middle Kingdom	3
Communist China Today	5
3. A LOOK AT COMMUNIST CHINA'S NEIGHBORS	8
Korea--The Dagger at Manchuria	9
Japan--The Rising Sun	10
Taiwan and the Kuomintang	11
4. THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE	13
The Factor of Nationalism	15
The Ideological Factor	21
The Factor of Conservatism	27
5. THEORETICAL FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES	32
The Security of Mainland China	32
The Removal of American Influence from the Far East	35
The Creation of a Communist Hegemony in Asia . .	39
The Reestablishment of the Ancient Chinese Boundaries	41
China as the Spokesman and Mentor of the Worldwide Communist Movement	41
6. COMPARISON WITH ACTUAL POLICIES	44
How Peking Views the World	46
Mao Looks at America	47
Russia and Revisionism	50
A Foreign Policy Potpourri	51
The Possibilities for Dissension	54
7. PORTENT FOR THE FUTURE	58
BIBLIOGRAPHY	62

SUMMARY

The history of relations between Communist China and the rest of the world over the past two decades has been one of almost continuous conflict in either the physical or the political arena. This seems to reflect the more than a century of experience that has perhaps convinced Peking's leaders of the effectiveness of political and physical power as the supreme arbiter in international relations.

This sovereign state has seen its territory traded as a pawn among the great powers of the world; twice during the past fifty years, first at Versailles and again at Yalta. China, whose destiny for a hundred years was shaped by outsiders, has suddenly become a nation whose influence is felt on every continent. For the first time in modern history, China is effectively projecting her incipient power and demonstrating her power potential as a factor in international affairs. As China continues to develop her nuclear arsenal, she adds to her status as a world power--without whose cooperation or collaboration few of the decisive problems of our era could be solved.

In spite of this, China has not achieved a success in the international arena comparable to her status as a growing world power. Several factors mitigate against her as, like a stumbling giant, she seeks to take her place on the world scene.

There are few who would attempt to deny China her sovereignty, but each of her neighbors in the world community has a right to expect that she conduct herself in accordance with practices generally accepted among civilized nations. This, China has been unable to do as she flails around the international arena blinded by the centuries. She has a limited view of the modern world community and a dearth of experience in applying economic theory to problems brought about by modern economic realities.

This study evaluates China and her relationships with South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan--not in isolation but as a part of the world in which China must either grow and prosper as an international power or become the vassal of another world power.

It can be concluded that because of China's myopic view of the world's happenings, she draws invalid conclusions; she confuses short-term gains for long-range objectives; and she engages in international intransigence rather than internal improvement. China's future is closely bound to that of her closest neighbors with whom she now seeks to maintain the status quo. Yet, Peking continues her bellicosity in South Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Her actions in these areas seem to be motivated by anti-Americanism and anti-Sovietism.

The promise of the future holds much or little for China--depending solely on her own actions and policies. If she stresses her inborn conservatism, China will take her place among the great powers; however, if she elects to continue international meddling, intransigence, and bellicosity, her Mandate of Heaven will be in serious jeopardy.

This study concentrates in the area of South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan and concludes that Peking's bid for world-wide recognition is being made outside this area of study. China's best opportunity to achieve her objectives in these rimland countries is to apply conservative caution to all her relations with Korea and Japan and as pertains to Taiwan to attempt to secure United Nations recognition as the legitimate government of China.

CHAPTER 1

China . . . a vast slumbering lion which
will astound the world when it awakens.

--Napoleon I

INTRODUCTION

On 2 September 1965, Marshal Lin Piao, Defense Minister of the People's Republic of China, outlined the long-range strategic objectives of his country in an article commemorating the twentieth anniversary of China's victory over Japan.* The statement seems to establish China's foreign policy goals as a dual-pronged, long-range desire to destroy the United States and to assume the role of leader of the world Communist movement.

This is a most significant statement of policy, but apart from some conceptual generalizations about the encirclement of North America and western Europe by Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the Marshal leaves much to the conjecture of the reader as to just how these goals are to be achieved.

This paper confines itself to a detailed examination and analysis of Communist China's goals and policies in three critical neighboring areas--each, to a varying degree, under United States influence. In studying South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan as they relate to Communist China, it was necessary to present a brief

*See "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," an article written by Lin Piao, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and Minister of National Defense, in commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the Chinese People's war of resistance against the Japanese.

history of Chinese relations with each of these nations. This glance into the past is followed by a statement of the current relationships existing among these oriental neighbors. An attempt has been made to look inside China, to isolate her major motivating factors, to analyze what appear to be her short and long-term goals, and to determine, as far as possible, how these are related to South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. A determination is then made of what would appear to be ideal theoretical objectives and policies which mainland China could establish with respect to the aforementioned nations. These deduced objectives and policies are compared with the objectives and policies which, in actuality, Red China seems to have established. From this comparative process are distilled those areas wherein there appears to be mutual agreement between the theoretical and the actual. An attempt has been made to rationalize Peking's foreign policy objectives and policies where they seem to be divergent from the ideal.

Lastly, an analysis is made of existing relationships between the United States and South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan for their value to Communist China as she plans her campaign against American influence in these countries. The study is concluded with a portent of things to come in China's relations with her neighbors.

CHAPTER 2

By using history as a mirror, you will
understand the rise and fall of emperors.
--Old Chinese adage.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

This chapter will attempt to develop the background and foundation upon which is built the present-day foreign policy of the People's Republic of China. From a brief look at a Sinocentric universe extending well back into the era of the Roman Empire will be extracted the prime views and motivating factors of China's current leadership, not as Communists but as Chinese. To this will be added those elements of current foreign policy views which are Marxist-Leninist or derivatives therefrom which play a significant role in the present-day policies of the People's Republic in its relationship with the other members of the world community of nations. From these and other considerations, an attempt will be made to draw the fundamental aims of present-day foreign policy of the People's Republic of China.

THE MIDDLE KINGDOM

The sun at its zenith on 21 June shines through an apperture in the tiled ceiling of a blue-domed building to illuminate a small circular area in the exact center of the large main chamber of Peking's Temple of Heaven. For nearly four thousand years

this symbolic relationship between the Chinese people and nature has been visual confirmation that China was truly the center of the universe. They, having a high cultural attainment and being surrounded by weaker peoples who paid tribute to the rulers in Peking and assumed the Chinese culture, made it easy for the Chinese to believe that their country actually was the center of the universe and that they as a people had a Mandate of Heaven¹ which was entrusted to successful rulers. From this, down through the centuries grew the strong belief that whoever wanted to have any type of relationship with the Chinese would do so from the position of a tributary. Others must recognize the supremacy of China and do nothing to disorient the orderly processes of the Sinocentric universe. Those who were not Chinese and who made no effort to absorb the Chinese culture were barbarians and could not become an equal of the enlightened ones operating under a Mandate of Heaven. China was truly the Middle Kingdom,² and because of natural law all other nations and peoples were farther away from the sun--the source of light and the prime source of good to all things.³ As plants who get the most sun grow best and tallest, so is it also with nations; therefore, all other nations were inferior and populated by barbaric people. Given this background and culture, it is easy to understand China's supercilious xenophobia.

¹Warner Levi, Modern China's Foreign Policy, p. 3.

²The Chinese believed they were literally situated in the center of the world, called their country The Middle Kingdom and their emperor the Son of Heaven. The first map published in China in the 17th century showed China as the center world.

³Levi, op. cit., p. 13.

COMMUNIST CHINA TODAY

These unrealistic views have in large measure been brought forward to comingle with the Maoist version of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist dogma, a divinely guided revolutionary movement designed to achieve governmental control or to dominate those who do control. The marriage of these two ideologies is in no way contradictory to the pattern of thought or values of the Chinese or of the Communists. Maoist Communism should not be viewed in the traditional mode of Trotsky. The modern-day Chinese Communists are cautious, conservative, skilled diplomats with the clearly established goal of ultimate leadership of a Sino-centered Communist world.⁴ With this telescopic historical background, it is not difficult to rationalize China's present views as she observes today's world and as she formulates her foreign policies. She seeks to reestablish the hegemony she once exercised over much of Asia. She is eager to expand her cultural and political influence throughout all of Asia and to influence and lead nations of the newly emerging Third World. China has a strong sense of nationalism; consequently, it was easy to elicit the support of the Chinese people for Mao Tse-tung's stated policy that "Our nation will never again be an insulted nation. We have stood up."⁵ As once she sought to spread her

⁴Allen S. Whiting, "The Logic of Communist China's Policy: The First Decade," in China, The Emerging Red Giant: Communist Foreign Policies, ed. by Devere E. Pentony, p. 71.

⁵Mao Tse-tung speech, 21 Sep 1949, to the People's Consultative Conference, People's Democratic Dictatorship, p. 33.

culture, today she feels a real sense of urgency to spread her pragmatic view of a successful political philosophy. China's leaders are not "fair weather" Communists who cloak their historic goals in the mystique of Marxism. From all indications, they truly believe in the Communist idea. ". . . the Chinese Communists accept as articles of faith the basic Marxist concepts of dialectical and historical materialism, worldwide class struggle, and the inevitable overthrow of decaying capitalism by the proletariat of all countries."⁶ Mao Tse-tung in his speech before the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 6 November 1957, stated:

In the end, the Socialist system will replace the Capitalist system. This is an objective law independent of human will. No matter how hard the reactionaries try to prevent the advance of the wheel of history, revolution will take place sooner or later and will surely triumph.

Given her historic traditions and current ideology, China, it seems, needed someone to become the bad example; someone on which to vent her xenophobia. Out of World War II came the perfect enemy to take over all the hatred so long engendered against the colonial powers. During the Korean War this nation was to become the enemy of the Chinese people, a paper tiger that was driven out of Manchuria by the People's Army.⁷ This imperialist enemy has kept China out of the United Nations; it supports the Kuomintang; it seeks to suppress the freedom of the people of Vietnam as it

⁶A. Doak Barnett, "The Roots of Mao's Strategy" in China, The Emerging Red Giant: Communist Foreign Policies, ed. by Devere E. Pentony, p. 89.

⁷Levi, op. cit., p. 287.

does those of South Korea; it has restored the Fascists to power in Japan, and now it seeks a rapprochement with the Russian Revisionists. The enemy of the Chinese people, if one believes the statements of Red China's leaders, is America, a dying capitalist state seeking to continue its suppression by colonialism and to satisfy its economic needs by imperialism.⁸ Given this historical sketch and ideological political philosophy, let us attempt to delineate the foreign policy goals sought by China's leaders.

The first goal of any nation is to maintain the security of the homeland. In addition, as will be pointed out later, the Chinese seek to create a hegemony in Asia. In order that this may be achieved it will be necessary to remove foreign, and particularly American, influence from the Far East. No matter who rules China, there will be a desire which stems from historical sources to reestablish the Chinese suzerainty of years gone by. Indications are that Red Chinese political theorists have a desire to become the spokesmen and mentors of the worldwide Communist movement with particular priority being given to the newly emerging nations of the Third World.

⁸Ibid., p. 290.

CHAPTER 3

In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China; but in order to conquer China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia.

--Baron Giiaki Tanaka
25 July 1927

A LOOK AT COMMUNIST CHINA'S NEIGHBORS

Around China today are a series of nations; some great, some small, some nearly independent, others just establishing themselves as entities in the world community of nations. Most of these nations are either dependent on one of the great powers or play off one power against another in order to achieve their national goals. China is confronted by neighboring nations in either an American or a Soviet hegemony, and it is her aim to disrupt these relationships. Even though there is unrest along the 5,000 mile border that China shares with the USSR, her primary emphasis is placed on those areas where she is confronted by nations whom she considers as satraps of America--a powerful enemy but one whose homeland is thousands of miles away rather than one with whom she shares a common, though disputed border. This chapter will deal with three of these nations--South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. We shall look at the problem from an historical perspective; recounting problem areas and highlighting trends which are prevalent in each.

KOREA--THE DAGGER AT MANCHURIA

The Japanese have for years alluded to Korea as "the dagger pointing toward Japan's heart." Now with South Korea squarely in the Western camp, the dagger held in other hands points directly at China's most highly industrialized area, Manchuria.¹ This is most exacerbating, particularly in view of the United States' withdrawal of its forces from Korea in 1949 and of the announcement of Secretary of State Dean Acheson that Korea was not vital to United States interests in the Far East. The entire picture was changed by the North Korea invasion of South Korea in June 1950, and by the immediate reentry of United States power on the Asiatic mainland. While no official ending of the war has eventuated, United States forces remain in Korea, and a treaty, albeit particularly unpalatable, has been concluded between Korea and her former conqueror, Japan.

Where but fifteen short years ago all vestiges of American and Japanese power had been eradicated from the Asiatic mainland, today the dagger in unfriendly hands is pointed directly at China's major agricultural and industrial basin and Manchuria's primary hydroelectric power source.² The United States is firmly re-established in Korea and bilateral treaties have been ratified between Korea and Japan and the United States.

¹ Helmut G. Callis, China, Confucian and Communist, p. 211.

² Ibid., p. 411.

JAPAN--THE RISING SUN

As far back as the 16th century, the Japanese were attempting to establish themselves on the Asiatic mainland. It was not until 1876 that they were finally successful when they signed a "treaty of amity and commerce" at Kangwha with China's vassal, the Hermit Kingdom. After several years of bickering between the two major Asian powers, Japan finally won out over China in 1895 when China lost Korea and Taiwan to the Empire in the humiliating peace treaty of Shimonoseki. To this was added more territory when following World War I Japan was given most of Germany's concessions in China. Amid the mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in late 1945, Japan disappeared as an Asiatic power, only to rise again Phoenix-like from the atomic ashes to become America's handmaiden in the Far East and the bastion from which American power radiates throughout all Asia. Where twenty years ago Japanese militarists were hopelessly crushed, today America assists in the rebuilding of Japanese military strength.³

China must be on guard lest Japan move once more onto the Asiatic mainland to fill the vacuum created by the breakup of the old colonial empires. It would do little good to again purge American influence from Asia only to have a Japanese rather than a Chinese hegemony emerge.

³Jen Ku-ping, "Japanese Militarism on the Road Back," Peking Review, Vol VIII, No. 50, 10 Dec 1965, p. 6.

TAIWAN AND THE KUOMINTANG

The problem of Taiwan and the Nationalist government is one which Peking has not approached rationally and dispassionately. Into that problem are comingled all the threads of personal, political, military, nationalistic, and face-saving mechanisms which have been evident in Chinese society and government since the breakup of the Manchu dynasty. Consequently, a complicated fabric has been woven by the interaction of all these facets of the problem. The Chinese Revolution, from Mao's point of view, will not be completed until Taiwan once more comes under the control of the mainland government; until Chiang Kai-shek bows to the Peking regime; until all vestiges of United States influence are gone from the scene. The problem, important though it may be to the mainland Chinese, is beyond their ability to solve from a military point of view, and any political solution is unacceptable to the Generalissimo. Thus is created a situation which keeps American power close to mainland China--an area of influence contrary to Communist Chinese aims. The resolution of this problem will materially assist Communist China to become a truly great power. Communist China made a modest beginning in 1954 when it attempted to take Quemoy and Matsu by military force, only to find that major United States support of Nationalist China was not compensated for by similar assistance to Peking from the USSR. This resulted in a loss of face for Red China's leaders in the

eyes of all their Asian neighbors, offsetting to a degree the prestige gained by their limited success in Korea. Perhaps the most important elements of the Taiwan situation are that it exists-- a problem beyond the ability of Peking to solve; that it forms a base for intelligence operations; that it is evidence of Peking's military impotence; that it forms a basis for continued control of the overseas Chinese; and, that Nationalist China still holds a prestige position in the United Nations.

CHAPTER 4

A hungry people will not endure reason;
they will not listen to justice; and they
will not bend to any prayers for mercy.

--Seneca

THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE

This chapter will survey the areas of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan to highlight the various governing factors at work in each and point out how Communist China can capitalize on her strengths and protect against her weaknesses to achieve her foreign policy objectives. A power analysis cannot be assessed against the elements of national power in absolute terms but rather in terms of and in relation to the threat. In the case of Communist China this is a difficult task for an outside observer. First, because it is rather difficult to clearly define any real threat to China except to her self-assumed role of worldwide leadership of revolution and wars of national liberation; secondly, China could achieve most of her goals, other than political, by peacefully consolidating her gains at home and attempting to solve some of her internal problems; and lastly, because while China acts in a conservative manner in keeping with her power potential, her leaders talk a hard line; for example, the bellicose statement of Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Chen I at a press conference in Peking on 29 September 1965:

The Chinese people are ready to make all necessary sacrifices in the fight against imperialism. It is up to the U.S. President and the Pentagon to decide whether the United States wants a big war with China today. We cherish no illusions about U.S. imperialism. We are fully prepared against U.S. aggression. If the U.S. imperialists are determined to launch a war of aggression against us, they are welcome to come sooner, to come as early as tomorrow. Let the Indian reactionaries, the British imperialists, and the Japanese militarists come along with them! Let the modern revisionists act in coordination with them from the north! We will still win in the end.¹

It is assumed that Chinese national power will be applied more in keeping with her conservative actions than in support of the bellicose statements of her leaders. One must not, however, overlook a deep-seated belief which springs from deep within the mores of the Chinese, whether Communist or otherwise. This is the belief in a "Mandate of Heaven" which is "lost when power is lost and power is lost when the people stop supporting their government."² In Chinese political heritage, continued success of governmental programs is evidence that the mandate continues, or as Mencius (or Meng-tse) put it, "Heaven sees as the people see, Heaven hears as the people hear;"³ therefore, sooner or later China's leaders should begin to achieve some of the goals they have announced, or the people will begin to believe that the mandate has been lost. For that reason one cannot totally overlook these boastful and bellicose statements, no matter how ridiculous they may seem to

¹ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, No. 197 (6S), 1965, Tuesday, 12 Oct, p. 12.

² Callis, op. cit., p. 468.

³ Mencius, as quoted by Callis, op. cit., p. 310.

the well informed. Students of China should never forget that China's leaders, except for Chou En-lai, have never been exposed to the modern outside world. Some have been to 19th century France, and others to 20th century Russia, but few have ever seen a really modern nation or its people.

In the main, the underlying motivations which affect China's policies are a balanced blend of historical, cultural, ideological, and psychological factors combined with a monumental ignorance of the outside world. A better understanding of the interrelationship of these factors will greatly benefit a planner in fathoming China's actions and understanding her policies toward the other members of the world community. These factors which I shall group together and describe as Chinese nationalism and Marxist ideology are complementary; however, at times they may conflict. These factors have been applied in a conservative manner as far as Red China's actual foreign relations are concerned. Dr. Allen S. Whiting calls these the "three C's" of Mao's strategy--the Chinese element, the Communist element, and the element of caution.⁴ It now remains to relate these factors to our areas of concern in an attempt to discern China's foreign policy objectives in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.

THE FACTOR OF NATIONALISM

This factor has its genesis in China's historical and cultural heritage and is manifest in a combination of Sinocentrism and

⁴Whiting, op. cit., p. 70.

xenophobia. As she was once the center of the universe, so once again she hopes to become the worldwide fountainhead of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine. The Chinese people with the cooperative assistance of the central government appear to believe they are predestined for a prime role in the world and in Asia in particular.⁵ This preeminence will come about, so they have been told, only as a result of China's effort, not by reliance upon Revisionists or barbarians from outside China. Peking seeks to regain all territory formerly Chinese and to remove from Asia all forms of Western colonialism and American encroachment.⁶

Let us see now how this nationalistic feeling could be applied to our area of concern. Taiwan has been a natural target of Chinese nationalism since Japan took it, along with Korea and the Pescadores, in 1895. Every Chinese leader in modern times has tried to make it clear that China does not intend to relinquish its right to any area over which the old order had suzerainty.⁷ Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao Tse-tung in turn enunciated as national policy the determination to reestablish the onetime greatness of China.

For more than twenty centuries the Chinese have upheld the Confucian axiom that the only lasting political unity was one based on homogeneity of ideas and culture. In accordance with this

⁵Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," p. 22.

⁶Theodore G. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 649.

⁷Robert C. North, "Peking's Drive for Empire: The New Expansionism," in China, The Emerging Red Giant: Communist Foreign Policies, ed. by Devere E. Pentony, p. 58.

position, they have consistently recognized as legitimate only those Korean governments that have received "investiture" by ruling Chinese authority and were bound to China ideologically.

Whenever in the course of history, that government was menaced by internal or external enemies, the Chinese, if they had the strength, would intervene on its behalf.⁸ When Red China entered the Korean peninsula in late 1950, she was reasserting her dominant position in the old Hermit Kingdom which she had been forced by Japan to repudiate a half century earlier. Peking was once again committed to the support of a sympathetic government and to the creation of a China-oriented buffer state along her northeastern frontier.⁹

In 1950 China's policy in Korea was governed by her Chinese nationalism which has been the prime motivating force in the years since. Barring a major war, the stalemate in Korea will probably continue to be a long-term economic and political struggle between North and South and a continuing source of tension between Mainland China and the United States.¹⁰ China has provided extensive aid to the North Koreans in the "profound belief that the strengthening and development of this (Sino-Korean) cooperation is consistent with the vital interests of the two peoples and is of great significance in the cause of defending peace in the Far East."¹¹

⁸Callis, op. cit., p. 411.

⁹A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia, A Challenge to American Policy, p. 288.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 289.

¹¹"Communique on Negotiations Between the People's Republic of China and Government Delegations of Democratic People's Republic of Korea," US Dept of State Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 694, 24 Nov 1953, Preamble of the Agreement.

The voice of authority in North Korea is Chinese. Chinese advisors remain with the Army, and Chinese People's Volunteers have assisted in the reconstruction. Intermarriage is fostered between the Chinese immigrants and Korean women. Truly "the traditional militant friendship of the Chinese and Korean people, cemented by blood" is entering a "new stage of history."¹² Korea, now more than ever, is a border province of China. Korean workers in China's mines and factories are rapidly mastering industrial techniques, and Korean students study in China's universities. "Korea, north of the 38th parallel, has been successfully tied into a Far Eastern system which is controlled and run by China according to peculiarly Chinese concepts of Asian solidarity and nationalism."¹³

To the United States, who, after her World War II experience with the Japanese militarists, believed that the security and stability of Asia could best be maintained through a strong and stable China, the Korean experience was a traumatic one. At the outset of the Korean War, President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to throw an umbrella over the Taiwan Straits to insure that the island did not fall into Communist hands. This action reversed the United States' position taken only a scant seven months earlier when Truman had reiterated the Potsdam declaration to return Taiwan to China; he further stated at that time that the United States had no desire to establish military bases on Taiwan, would not provide

¹²Callis, op. cit., p. 416.

¹³Ibid., p. 417.

military aid or advice to Nationalist Chinese forces on Taiwan, and had no intention of becoming involved in the internal conflict in China.¹⁴ With the coming of the war, the period of rapprochement ended. Today the Mainland Chinese still try to overcome the "cordon sanitaire" imposed by the United States in the Taiwan Straits. Communist China's military inability to span the narrow channel and her political truculence, together with American intransigence, have served to keep the pot boiling. China now seems to be patiently waiting for the plum to fall into her lap, with only an occasional shake of the United Nations tree. Each year she comes closer to membership in the U.N. The political solution to this long-standing problem will probably come about with little effort on the part of the Communist Chinese, other than the practice of caution and patience.

Peking's relations with Japan are, in general, conducted outside official governmental agencies because Japan recognizes the Nationalist government on Taiwan. A growing pro-Chinese sentiment seems to have pervaded almost all sections of the Japanese intelligentsia and is prevalent in most of the other strata of Japanese society. This expression of emotional empathy might well stem from a common civilization and a cultural affinity between the two nations; also, there is to a marked degree a guilt complex--a lingering regret that Japan has wronged China and must somehow make amends for past

¹⁴US Dept of State, Bulletin, 16 Jan 1950, p. 79.

actions of the Japanese warlords.¹⁵ Edgar Snow, whose objectivity can be questioned, finds a curious sense of unexplained war guilt among Japanese who know China best. This is skillfully exploited by the Peking government which receives its Japanese guests in a spirit of "let bygones be bygones" and with expressions of desire to restore peace and unity in an Asian community of the future. Many Japanese see in China's resurgent demands for Western withdrawal and in her increasingly bellicose dialogue with Russia a continuation of Japan's own lost dream of an Asian empire. "A sense of unity and resentment against the white masters' dominance in the Asian world is always latent between China and Japan."¹⁶ Other, more active support for Chinese Communist aims can be found in the policies and activities of the Japanese Communist Party and the Socialist Party, both of whom were uncompromisingly against the military alliance with the United States and the retention of bases on Japanese soil, whether in the home islands or on Okinawa.¹⁷ Peking seems to have decided to work through the more influential Socialist Party. She has assiduously cultivated her interests and influence among the Socialists. A high-level Japanese Socialist Party delegation led by its late left-wing Secretary-General, Inejero Asanuma, visited China in March, 1959,

¹⁵Vidya Prakash Dutt, China's Foreign Policy, 1958-62, p. 239.

¹⁶Edgar Snow, China, Russia, USA: Changing Relations in a Changing World, p. 677.

¹⁷Dutt, op. cit., p. 239.

to convey to the Chinese people the Japanese people's fervent desire for peace, democracy, and the earliest resumption of diplomatic relations with China; to promote people's diplomacy in order to consolidate and develop the friendship between the peoples of the two countries; and to step up the efforts of the peoples of the two countries to remove the artificial barriers raised against normalization of Sino-Japanese relations.¹⁸

The Chinese government seems to have made clear to Japan that

"economic intercourse and political relations cannot be separated."¹⁹

Even though Red Chinese officials work closely with Japanese individuals of any political affiliation or economic purpose, they have not forgotten the Japanese Communist Party which is perhaps the most genuinely pro-Peking of all the Communist parties of the world. The Chinese tactic at present is for the Japanese Communist Party to work through the Popular Front while Chinese leadership works with the Japanese Socialist Party.²⁰

THE IDEOLOGICAL FACTOR

Let us now take a brief look at the ideological factor and apply it to our area of interest. In general, the Maoists claim to be confirmed and unwavering Marxist-Leninists. However, in spite of all their claims of pure Marxism, much Maoism has and continues to be infused into the Red Chinese version of Communist dogma. For example, Director of the Propaganda Department and

¹⁸Peking Review, No. 12, 24 Mar 59.

¹⁹Dutt, op. cit., p. 240.

²⁰Ibid., p. 243-44.

member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Lu Ting-yi has stated in "The World Significance of the Chinese United Democratic Front of China" that:

The integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution constitutes Mao Tse-tung's theory of the Chinese revolution . . . it is of universal significance for the world Communist movement. It is indeed a new contribution to the treasury of Marxism-Leninism.²¹

This statement indicates the firm belief that the thought of Mao is the fountainhead of China's ideology and that Mao is the leader of the world revolution. China's leaders seem to believe that Peking is destined to project her "correct" political dogma throughout world communist organizations with particular emphasis in the Third World. This political theory is intertwined with China's nationalism--her confirmed belief that she is destined to become once again the Middle Kingdom and that one result of Communism is to bring this about.²² China's leaders are dedicated to the promotion of her world stature. They appear to have a strong sense of mission and to interject a narrowly doctrinaire flavor in all their international actions. Each act seems to be viewed in political perspective and indications are that every instrument of power in the arsenal of options will be unhesitatingly used if by so doing China's national or ideological interests can be advanced or enhanced.

²¹Pentony, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

²²Guy Wint, "China and Asia," in China, The Emerging Red Giant, ed. by Devere E. Pentony, p. 29.

The Chinese Communists have used practically every ideological and propaganda tool to apply direct and indirect pressure on the Japanese government and have attempted to influence Japanese public opinion against established governmental policies. Issues relating to trade, fishing rights, and prisoners of war have been deliberately contrived and manipulated by Peking for political purposes.²³ Peking has attempted to use the oversea Chinese to create a boycott of goods "made in Japan" in an effort to embarrass the Japanese government and to demonstrate to the peoples of Asia that China has reemerged as a great power--one to be recognized and dealt with by all Asian nations as the leader of her neighbors. This, of course, is another effort to create a Chinese hegemony. The Red Chinese leaders have developed a practice of viewing each and every issue in ideological terms, and they are also very adept in orchestrating ideology and nationalism whenever they can gain prestige for themselves. This is vividly demonstrated by China's relations with Japan on the "resumption of unofficial trade contracts" when she suggested that "Japan could reap rich benefits from an expansion of trade with China."²⁴

In March of 1958, China signed an unofficial trade agreement with a delegation of Japanese Trade Organization representatives involving an exchange of about 190 million dollars worth of goods.

²³Barnett, op. cit., p. 257.

²⁴Yuan-li Wu, "The Weapon of Trade," Pentony, op. cit., p. 227.

Japan would furnish China with 150,000 tons of steel and iron, copper ingots, aluminum, chemical fertilizers, and other manufactured goods in return for China's rice, soya beans, iron ore, manganese, pig iron, and farm produce. Among the administrative provisions associated with this agreement was the establishment of a permanent nonofficial "People's Trade Mission" in Tokyo.²⁵

The Chinese People's Trade Mission insisted on flying the national flag of Red China over their offices throughout Japan much to the embarrassment of Japanese Foreign Minister Kishi whose government maintained diplomatic relations with the other China on Taiwan. The tempo and pressure of Peking's efforts increased as her campaign to drive a wedge between the Japanese government and the Japanese people was intensified. Peking demanded that the Japanese government extend diplomatic relations to Communist China as the price for the implementation of the trade agreement. During the Japanese election campaign of 1958 Peking launched almost daily vituperative attacks on the reactionary policies of the "war criminal" Kishi and began a step-by-step procedure for breaking the unofficial trade agreement.

When the Red Chinese flag was torn down from a Trade Mission office in Nagasaki, Peking used the Japanese Communist and Socialist Parties to create a political uproar. Foreign Minister Kishi said

²⁵"Unofficial Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement," New York Times, 11 May 1958, pp. 1 and 32.

that since the Trade Mission was in Japan in an unofficial capacity, he did not regard it as a matter requiring governmental action. The Chinese stated that the honor of their national flag was involved and that Japan had a sacred duty to safeguard their flag, and further, that Kishi was deliberately ruining the trade agreement; whereupon, they cancelled the agreement themselves. The Chinese government insisted that Japan change its attitude toward Communist China and stated that if Japan wanted to trade with them diplomatic recognition must be resumed before trade could take place. The Red Chinese emphasized that politics could not be separated from economics and that Japan must nullify its recognition of Taiwan before normal relations between the two nations could be resumed. Peking made it plain that it was for the Japanese people to choose their own government, but it was wishful thinking to expect China to change its attitude as long as the Japanese government continued to be hostile toward China.²⁶

Many have conjectured as to why Peking acted so preemptorily. It has been regarded as an attempt to discredit the Japanese government or to influence the impending elections. Another reasonable solution might be that China realized the impossibility of official relationships with the Japanese government without first overcoming American influence. It has been proposed that China considered trade to be the best wedge to force the split.

²⁶Jen-min Jih-pao, editorial, 16 May 1958, as quoted by Dutt, op. cit., p. 236.

China's policy to combat American influence in the Orient had suddenly become rigid and uncompromising. China's leaders were probably disappointed to discover that Russia would not support the use of force in the Taiwan Straits. Russian space leadership was being successfully challenged by America. United States power and influence was replacing that of the French and the British in the Far East. Peking realized she could do little to combat this growing American prestige where American vital interests in the Far East were concerned; therefore, she sought retrenchment in Japan and intensified her efforts in more fertile fields of international unrest--Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.

Communist Chinese efforts in our area of concern have been concentrated on keeping ideological pressure on the United States in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Her principal efforts went into the building of a Popular Front in the "have not" nations of the Third World and into a racist appeal that all nonwhites band together under Peking leadership against white domination of the world. Red China began to canalize her power resources into the formation of a third center in a fracturing bipolar world. It was only by pursuing this course of action that the U.S.--USSR power dichotomy could be broken, and it was only in the Third World that such a battle could be mounted successfully.²⁷

²⁷Dutt, op. cit., pp. 311-312.

THE FACTOR OF CONSERVATISM

While the factor of conservatism is traditional in China, its modern derivation comes from Mao Tse-tung's admonition to "despise the enemy strategically but to respect him tactically."²⁸ In respecting the enemy tactically, Red China's leaders are careful to insure that China's actions in the international arena do not match the recklessness of her propaganda.

From her recent experience in Africa, she has learned that while the people of that continent may be "ripe for revolution," as Chou En-lai stated, the leaders of the newly-emerged nations clearly understand that revolution can only mean their loss of power, of local prestige, and of control. China has begun to realize that unity of the so-called oppressed nations under Peking's flag will not be an easy achievement. Even a partial success would still leave Communist China wanting as far as the power equation with the West is concerned. This has been further driven home to Peking by the schism between the Kremlin and the Temple of Heaven. No longer can the Chinese continue to ignore Europe. They now realize that polycentrism has not splintered the bipolar world which continues to exist because of a delicate balance. The equalizing arrangement is not placed in danger of imbalance by the fact that Peking continues to ignore the arrangement. The conservative approach seems to be to wean away a portion of the balance, which

²⁸ Lin Piao, op. cit., p. 21.

she attempted to do by her relations with Albania, with leaders of the Third World, and subsequently with De Gaulle.

In her struggle to reshape the world, it is surprising that Peking and Quai d'Orsay were so long in getting together. Many of the political assumptions of De Gaulle and Mao Tse-tung are compatible, and the French leader has an even longer record of personal "struggle" against the governmental leaders of the Western world than does the charismatic Chinese leader. Like Mao in China, De Gaulle seeks to reestablish the status of power and grandeur in France. While Mao seeks to reestablish the Empire of ancient dynasties, De Gaulle dreams of a revitalization of a homogeneous community not dominated by the American colossus. Similarly, Mao, seeking hegemony of the Orient, realizes he cannot succeed as long as American influence and support are available to those Asian nations who see no future in becoming satraps of Peking. As De Gaulle finally felt it to be vital that he pursue an independent policy supported by his own nuclear arsenal, so has Mao proceeded down an identical road. However, Mao may have crossed the Rubicon as far as the reestablishment of amicable relations with the USSR is concerned, while Charles De Gaulle has been somewhat more astute in his relations with the Western powers. Both leaders, however, have pursued a cautious policy while maintaining a continuing oral bellicosity.

Peking has demonstrated her cautious conservatism several times, but at no time more effectively than in the Quemoy crisis of

1958²⁹ when an American naval task force convoyed Chinese Nationalist supply ships to beleaguered Quemoy. Communist shore batteries ceased firing when the U.S.-Nationalist Chinese convoy approached the three-mile limit. At this point the U.S. vessels stopped while the Nationalist ships continued on. After an appropriate time interval to permit American combat escort vessels to be well away from the line of fire, the Red batteries opened up on the Nationalist ships, sinking many of the Nationalist ships but scrupulously avoiding any direct action against the American Navy. The Communist Chinese demonstrated a similar conservative restraint in attacking only Nationalist aircraft supporting the Quemoy operation; whenever American aircraft escorted Nationalist air transports, the MIG's never came close to the area of operations.

Another example of Chinese Communist caution in relation to a confrontation with American armed forces occurred when the Reds were massing their forces for an attempted assault across the Taiwan Straits in 1950. When President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to the area, the Mainland Chinese immediately abandoned any effort to take over the island of Taiwan, which was the next logical objective after the securing of the mainland and the consolidation of Hainan.³⁰

The only arena in which Mao pitted his strength against that of the United States was in Korea and then only after repeated

²⁹Whiting, op. cit., p. 77.

³⁰Ibid., p. 76.

official and unofficial announcements and warnings to the United States that Peking would be forced to intervene if the UN forces crossed the 38th parallel. When these warnings were ignored, she engaged U.S. and South Korean forces with her Army in a hard-fought battle so there could be no doubt that these were Chinese regulars, even though no public announcement had been made that Red China's troops were in North Korea. She then pulled back and waited nearly three weeks--sufficient time to permit the United Nations forces to withdraw below the 38th without any loss of face. Peking had given her warnings and had demonstrated the seriousness of her intentions; now she was showing her conservatism. It was only after the UN forces continued their drive to the Yalu that Mainland China, in the belief that Manchuria was threatened, attacked in force across the frontier to engage the UN forces in North Korea and drive them back across the previous dividing line.³¹

In this chapter, we have considered the factors of Red China's caution, her nationalism, and her desires to spread Maoist Marxism. These considerations were applied to China's actions in our area of interest, and it was concluded that her leaders believe that China's foreign policy objectives in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea can best be attained through the application of political and economic pressure applied with caution while Peking goes on the political offensive in the Third World, particularly in South and Southeast

³¹Ibid., p. 74.

Asia. She will also seek a greater comity among the world's neutral nations, thus hoping to be voted into China's seat in the United Nations. It appears since Red China believes in the inevitability of her victory that she will not force a showdown at this time with America's closest Far Eastern allies, even though they may also be among Peking's closest neighbors. Red China has not set a time limit on her success. Patience is a characteristic of the Oriental culture. These goals which China seeks may not be achieved for a hundred years; but she will actively pursue her policies, having faith in an ultimate victory.

In the following chapter we will determine theoretical policies to achieve the previously stated foreign policy goals of Communist China.

CHAPTER 5

The task of statesmanship is to relate political theory to reality.

--John Foster Dulles

THEORETICAL FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

In this chapter an attempt will be made to determine specific theoretical foreign policy objectives of Communist China in the northeast Asian rimlands of South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.

It will be remembered that Peking's overall foreign policy objectives were determined to be to:

- 1) Maintain the security of Mainland China,
- 2) Remove American influence from the Far East,
- 3) Create a Communist Chinese hegemony in Asia,
- 4) Regain all territory formerly belonging to China,
- 5) Become the spokesman and mentor of worldwide Communism.¹

We shall consider each of these five broad objectives in turn and apply them to our specific area of concern.

THE SECURITY OF MAINLAND CHINA

None of the countries under investigation has the capability of generating a credible threat to Mainland China. Let us first dispose of the considerations applicable to South Korea by stating that unless there is a major war between China and either or both

¹See Chapter I.

of the other great powers, the United States or USSR, there is no threat posed by South Korea. It is only a continuation of U.S. military and economic assistance that maintains the government of that poor nation as a political and military entity. Once this aid is stopped, Korea must find assistance elsewhere or reduce her half-million man Army.² Historically, Korean economic relations have been with China and Japan, but politically, that course of action does not appear feasible as a short-run objective. The most probable long-range outcome is a relationship which will facilitate intercourse between the two halves of the economic, geographic, ethnic, and political entity which is Korea.

Japan does not constitute an immediate threat to the security of Mainland China; rather, many Japanese are undergoing psychological remorse for their acts against their cultural Asian brothers during the period 1931 to 1945.³ Japan should not be a major military threat to Communist China on the continent or anywhere in the Far East, barring a major war between Red China and the United States. It must be remembered, however, that Japan is a trading nation who imports most of the raw materials used in her industries. She is also dependent on imports to meet her growing requirements for coal and oil. Where Chinese and Japanese interests in these areas conflict, accommodation must be reached.

²Barnett, op. cit., p. 141.

³See Page 19.

It is possible that the security of the mainland can be threatened by the Chiang Kai-shek government on Taiwan. An evaluation of the military threat which the Nationalists pose can be outlined by asking ourselves a few questions. First, can Chiang mount a successful attack against the mainland without massive U.S. assistance? Secondly, would such an attack be supported by the citizens of the mainland, assuming the Nationalists could get an easement to the continent? Today, the answer to both of these questions would appear to be in the negative. While Taiwan and the Nationalists forces thereon present opportunities for harrassment of coastal shipping and provide a base for infiltrators and aerial observation, any actual threat to the security of Mainland China is inconsequential without massive American assistance combined with widespread unrest among Chinese on the mainland. Neither of these would appear to be valid assumptions at the present time.

It would appear that Communist China has little to fear concerning any threat to her security from South Korea, Taiwan, or Japan unless she were to become engaged in a major war with the United States. In the event she were to be involved in a war or even a period of great tension with the USSR, the military forces of South Korea and Taiwan would pose a problem of great concern because of their potential danger when Red China is engaged with another major enemy on the Asiatic mainland. In a war against the USSR, Peking would probably attempt to keep the United States neutral and to seek assurances that no American support would be

provided Chiang's Taiwanese Army or the South Korean Army. An agreement with the North Korean government might be achieved in order to provide a secure border along the Yalu and to insure protection of the southeastern entrances into the industrial and agricultural heartland of Manchuria.

In view of these considerations, it would appear that Communist China has little to fear from the northeast Asian rimland countries unless she is engaged in a major war with either or both the United States and the USSR.

THE REMOVAL OF AMERICAN INFLUENCE

FROM THE FAR EAST

This objective is one that bears heavily on China's nationalism and her ideology, and it is a most complicating factor in the cautious application of Communist China's national power in our area of concern.

In South Korea, American influence is once more firmly entrenched. American troops remain in South Korea, and American blood has enriched the soil of that beleaguered peninsula. How best can Communist China achieve her objective? What could be done that would remove American influence from Korea? Again, let us pose a few questions to see what answers we get and what conclusions might be drawn. Given a continuation of the present relaxed tensions in Korea, are American forces actually required? Is there any compelling reason why ten percent of America's ground forces

should be stationed in Korea at the limit of a 10,000 mile supply line? Does the stationing of American troops in Korea and the military and economic assistance provided that nation constitute a stabilizing factor in America's balance of payment problems? Under the present conditions, is Korea worth several billion dollars a year to the American people? With increasing costs and rapidly mounting troop requirements in Vietnam and with the American public interest concentrated in Southeast Asia, doesn't a dollar saving and a manpower reduction in South Korea appear to be a satisfactory course of action for the United States? Answers to these questions should point the way to China's policy in Korea to achieve her objective of removing American influence from the Hermit Kingdom. To achieve this objective in Korea, Red China should continue her calm, unruffled relationship in North Korea while she builds and strengthens her political and economic ties. Another ten years of calm in Korea could do what three years of war failed to do--remove once again American influence from the peninsula.

The removal of American influence from Taiwan will require a different course of action on the part of Mao and his Peking government. The best method for Red China to achieve her goal in Taiwan is through the United Nations where she may one day attain the support of a majority of the world's nations who will underwrite her contention that she is the legitimate government of China. Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung have already agreed that Taiwan is an integral part of China. From Communist China's point of view,

all that remains is to determine which is the legitimate government of China.⁴ The test of that question will be decided in the General Assembly of the United Nations. As we are only concerned in this paper with the removal of American influence from Taiwan, we need not become embroiled with the more complex question of Communist China in the Security Council, which of itself could be the subject of a separate study. Our problem can be summed up in the answers to these two questions: Is Taiwan a part of the Chinese nation, and who represents the government of that nation?

Unless some practical political arrangement can be made to establish Taiwan as a separate state, it is possible that a consensus of nations in the United Nations might deliver Taiwan to Peking. The General Assembly was divided 47 to 47 with 20 abstentions in its vote on that issue in November, 1965. If Taiwan were to come under the control of Communist China as a result of a United Nations vote, the United States would have to leave the island or be subject to censure for failing to abide by the world consensus. In order to achieve the support of a majority in the United Nations, Communist China must be prepared to be somewhat less truculent and to modify some of her announced preconditions to the acceptance of membership in the World Organization. These conditions can be changed by Peking's leaders as easily and as quickly as they were established.

⁴US Dept of Defense, "The Changing World" (15 Sep 61), China and the United Nations, p. 2.

The removal of American influence in Japan is progressing at a satisfactory rate, as is the diminution of Japanese relationships with the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan. If the political consolidation of the two Chinas occurs, all of Mao's efforts in Japan can be directed toward removal of American influence. Already, Japan's industrialists are seeking to trade manufactured goods for Mainland China's raw materials through unofficial channels.⁵ If the China question is resolved, the government of Japan would be free to recognize China without United States pressure to the contrary. If the United States were to continue to officially block Sino-Japanese trade and increased diplomatic, cultural, and technical exchanges, the Socialist Party would almost certainly become the dominant political party in Japan. As the Socialists already have an avowed policy calling for the removal of American influence from Japan and for the return of Okinawa to Japan, the Red Chinese goal would be achieved. The reduction of American influence in Japan is a goal that can best be achieved after the question of Taiwan is settled; therefore, Peking's best course of action is to maintain the status quo in her present relationship with Japan and to be prepared to conduct an economic, cultural, and political dialogue with Japanese governmental officials immediately upon resolution of the Taiwan question in the United Nations.⁶

⁵Tibor Mende, China and her Shadow, p. 306.

⁶Ibid., p. 309.

THE CREATION OF A COMMUNIST CHINESE HEGEMONY IN ASIA

The achievement of this objective in our area of concern is only possible when and if the influence of America is removed without being replaced by either Russian or Japanese influence.

In the consideration of this problem we can eliminate Taiwan because the Nationalists will continue to remain a ward of the United States, Taiwan will be returned to Mainland China, or some other political solution will be arrived at in the United Nations. If Red China cannot achieve her goal in Taiwan with the moral force of a majority of the nations of the UN behind her, she cannot hope to establish an hegemony over South Korea or Japan. China's goal in the latter two areas can best be achieved by political means.

Once American influence is removed from Korea, the great Chinese colossus whose presence has been felt in the Land of the Morning Calm for more than forty centuries will again assume a predominant role unless the USSR elects to concentrate her efforts on the peninsula, which she may do in order to provide security for her port at Vladivostok and the Maritime territory. Peking's best assurance of continued influence in the Korean peninsula is through the Communist Party of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. Political control of North Korea and an economic and cultural offensive directed toward a South Korea devoid of American influence would be most effective in the reestablishment of the historic Chinese hegemony.

Japan as a natural member of a Chinese hegemony is difficult to envision under a normal extension of foreseeable circumstances and relationships. A Chinese-controlled Communist Party of Japan, a sympathetic Japanese Socialist Party, a vigorous economic intercourse, a climate of cultural exchange--a Japan in this type of atmosphere with no military capability except a self-defense force would find it difficult indeed to maintain independent control of its destiny. China, having aggressive economic and political policies supported by a nuclear capability, could probably succeed in a policy of nuclear blackmail directed against Japan.

An assessment of Red China's atomic progress to date indicates possession of a nuclear device and the capability of achieving delivery means of sufficient range to reach Japan. Peking now has primary control of the Japanese Communist Party and is working to achieve a preponderance in the Socialist Party. It would appear, therefore, that once American influence has been effectively challenged, China would step up her political and economic relationships with Japan. If, in the long run this proved to be insufficient, China then would be in a position to use her demonstrated nuclear power to create an Asia-for-Asians alliance controlled in Peking and dominating Japan.⁷

The best course of action for Red China to take to achieve this result is to continue her economic, political, and cultural intercourse on an unofficial basis until she is able to sufficiently

⁷Davis B. Barlow, "Chinese Views on Escalation," Military Review, Jan, 1966, p. 62.

influence the Diet to make the relationship official Japanese policy. The making of Japan into a Chinese puppet will be a long and detailed program, built action upon action, one logical step at a time. Communist China will be required to emphasize her elements of caution and patience. Any misstep as to timing or pressure could bring the full force of American power to bear against her. The USSR would not come to China's assistance in this endeavor because the creation of a Chinese-dominated Asia would work against the long-range Soviet goal of a world Communist movement centered on the Kremlin rather than the Temple of Heaven.⁸

THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE ANCIENT CHINESE BOUNDARIES

The achievement of this goal would be made easier by the accomplishment of all the other foreign policy objectives. In our area of concern, however, if we achieve a reunification of China we have achieved the goal which both the Communist and Nationalist governments seek. Whether we have a Nationalist or a Communist China, there will be continuing efforts to reestablish Chinese control in areas along China's borders with India and perhaps with the Soviet Union, but these are questions beyond the scope of this paper.

CHINA AS THE SPOKESMAN AND MENTOR OF THE WORLDWIDE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

In order for China to succeed in this objective, she must be able to drive a wedge between the Soviet leadership and the Russian

⁸Mende, op. cit., p. 297.

Communist Party.⁹ She may, among other things, attempt to convince the leaders of all Communist parties that when Stalin died the Russian Army rather than true Marxism-Leninism was the prime factor in the selection of a Russian leader. Peking must demonstrate that upon Mao Tse-tung safely rests the mantle of true leadership for correct world Communism. It can be demonstrated that Russian military might, not Marxist-Leninist truths, was required in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. Revolution of the masses must be encouraged, controlled, and guided by the real and immutable truths of communism. There must be no cover-up for the unbridled use of bourgeois armed might against the very people on whom the party must grow. Mao will attempt to highlight Russian leaders working with the United States toward a common goal; for example, the recent joint effort to stop the outbreak over the Kashmir. Acts, depicted by Red China to be detrimental to Russian solidarity and security, will continue to be accentuated; for example, the Cuban missile crisis and the failure of Russian leadership to effect a peace settlement with East Germany. This campaign against the Russian leadership is outside the scope of this paper, but it is being conducted by the Chinese,¹⁰ and it has a bearing on the international scene.

⁹Chen I, op. cit., p. 12.

¹⁰Lin Piao, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

Red China should continue her efforts to dominate the Communist parties in North Korea and Japan and to create a front organization in South Korea; she must continue to work with the Socialist Party in Japan; and finally, she must improve her relationship with sympathetic and neutral governments in the United Nations.

These, then, are the ideal foreign policy objectives as they should be implemented in our area of concern. In the next chapter Red China's actual foreign relations will be examined to determine where her current actions deviate from the theoretical matrix of a successful policy to achieve her international objectives in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.

CHAPTER 6

Nothing doth more hurt a state than
that cunning men pass for wise.

--Francis Bacon

COMPARISON WITH ACTUAL POLICIES

In this chapter we shall compare the theoretical foreign policy outlined in Chapter 5 with the actualities of the relationships between Communist China and Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In so doing, an attempt will be made to discuss the areas of apparent difference between the theoretical policies and the actual policies as best they can be determined. In this analysis, emphasis will be placed on those facets which would tend to provide a common interest as compared to those facets which are divisive. Finally, an attempt will be made to analyze the differences.

The one outstanding condition that comes immediately to mind is that conditions reflected in Chapter 5 were predicated on an era of "peaceful coexistence," particularly as it relates to Communist China's relationship with the United States and the USSR. These two great powers are the only states having sufficient will or resources to interfere with the fruition of Peking's long-range objectives. It is here in China's relations with the USSR, not just in our area of concern but throughout the world from Albania to Tanzania to Cuba, that we find a clash with the Soviets over the ideological application of the Marxist dogma.

Red China's policy toward the United States, as avowed by Foreign Minister Chen I, was outlined on 6 October 1965, in Peking when he said:

The choice now is either to reimpose colonial shackles on people . . . in accordance with the global strategy of the U.S. . . . or to wage resolute struggles to defeat U.S. imperialism . . . China is ready to make its contribution to the struggle against U.S. imperialism.¹

In her relations with the United States and the USSR, Peking could, if she doesn't assiduously apply the factor of caution and conservatism, create a situation where all her foreign policy objectives--even the continuation of her government--would be placed in jeopardy.

Why has Red China embarked on this type of international relationship with the world's great powers when it would best serve her purposes to play down her differences with the USSR, to solidify her internal position, and to prepare an economic and psychological offensive against the occidental, colonial giant in the oriental western Pacific? This enigma is at the core of China's foreign relations problem.

Prior to June, 1950, Red China had taken over continental China from the Nationalists; American influence had been voluntarily withdrawn from mainland Asia; the United States had announced a hands-off policy in the affairs between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung; Japan was unarmed and had adopted a constitution forbidding rearmament; Sino-Soviet relations were good, with Russia providing technical aid and assistance. The Orient was China's

¹Foreign Broadcast Information Service No. 197, op. cit., p. 13.

plum--ripe and ready to drop into her lap. What happened to cause China's leaders to embark on a program of aggression and vituperation against the United States and of dissension and divisiveness with the Soviet Union? Let us look at some of the reasons that could have caused China's leaders to take this course of action.

HOW PEKING VIEWS THE WORLD

It would appear that China's leaders, who it will be recalled are almost totally unfamiliar with the twentieth century world of the west, were imbued with the strength induced by their victory over an already defeated and decaying autocracy. Mao Tse-tung and his contemporaries seem to believe they are living in the nineteenth century world of Marx because the conditions existing in their war-torn, backward, maladministered, inexcusably autocratic nation were comparable to those of the Marxist era. The Mandate of Heaven had been given them; the mantle of Marxist leadership and the laurel leaves of victory clothed them while their inward-looking habits bred by centuries of Sino-centrism and their lack of exposure to the advanced nations of the world blinded them to the realities of modern conditions. Blinded they were in 1949; blinded they have continued to be as they stumble and blunder today in their relations with the barbaric foreigners who are the imagined inferiors over whom they have been given a celestial mandate.²

²Barnett, op. cit., p. 41.

What conditions have brought this about? This is an era of abacus and atoms, of Confucius and computers, of pedicabs and space capsules--cohabitation of the incongruous--in a modern world inhabited by modern men who reason as ancient mandarins; who read all happenings through the blindfold of the centuries.

Here are a few examples of world occurrences which the Communist Chinese leaders evaluate according to ancient mores and judge according to a nineteenth century philosophy in this forward-moving twentieth century. Actions in Asia reflect the downfall of capitalist imperialism as the United States is driven out of the Orient; Indonesia becomes independent; India and Pakistan shed the influence of Britain; the French are forced out of Vietnam by free Asiatics; Egypt forces the British lion away from the Suez Canal; Tunisia and Morocco gain their freedom; Algeria wins by force of arms; Ghana becomes independent; Cyprus seethes with unrest and terrorism; while the Mau Mau snatch Kenya from the lion's paws; Batista falls to Castro, and Communism is victorious. The world is in an upheaval of torment and terrorism--challenge and change make the world ripe for revolution.

MAO LOOKS AT AMERICA

Let us now look at the United States through the eyes of Mao Tse-tung as he interpreted what he saw in 1949 and what he has since observed. He saw a bloated colonial empire humbled by a small Asiatic people in World War II. A power almost defeated

by a combination of Marxism and oriental nationalism in Korea. Internally, the United States, the bastion of colonialism and imperialism, appears to be writhing in the same death pains to which the Roman and British empires have already succumbed. Politically, America has been splintered by the Dixiecrats, the conservative Democrats, and the progressive Republicans. Socially, America is divided by the NAACP, the Ku Klux Klan, the CORE, the American Nazi Party, the white supremists of the South, and the modern abolitionists of the North. McCarthyism is rampant in the Congress and the press; Harry Gold, the Rosenbergs, and Alger Hiss act against an oppressive government; Puerto Rican Nationalists run amuck in the nation's capital shooting five Congressmen, threatening the President, and killing his bodyguard.

American industry is brought to a standstill by strikes in the steel mills, the coal mines, and on the docks and wharfs. America's gold is being siphoned away through give-away programs to rebuild the Nazis and Fascists.

American morals are being destroyed by interracial marriage, teenage delinquency, pornographic literature, and irresponsible television programs; Peyton Place replaces Sauk Center; the Hucksters outdo Horatio Alger. American religious strengths are being destroyed as Martin Luther King preaches racial divisiveness from the pulpit, while the Supreme Court forbids prayers and religious education in the public schools.

The militarists are making trouble causing the President to fire the most senior military man for insubordination. The first Secretary of Defense takes his life after an unsuccessful attempt to bring the Admirals and Generals under control. American aggression in Korea is continued by one President while a hopeful contender is elected on the basis that if he is President he will stop the war on the Asiatic mainland where America has no real need to be and where American manpower should never be committed. Two other Presidential hopefuls publicly debate the future of China's offshore islands. This may well be the Communist Chinese leaders' view of the world and of the United States because like Will Rogers, all they know is what they read in the newspapers. When Mao Tse-tung succeeded to power in China, and from his position in Peking looked outwardly through the narrow window of his limited experience, this was the view of the world which he and his contemporaries saw: capitalism was crumbling away at the very moment he had received the Mandate of Heaven.

Can the United States safely assume that reliable reports concerning American strength are available to Red China's Leaders? Do they have a true understanding of the economic viability of the United States and of the moral strength of the man-in-the-street in the United States?³

³Donald W. Klein, "Peking's Leaders: A Study in Isolation," Pentony, op. cit., p. 113.

RUSSIA AND REVISIONISM

Now, what about the Russians, those neighbors who through the centuries have had their eyes on China's industrial and agricultural heartland in Manchuria and who have maintained a condition of unrest and outright invasion in Mongolia and elsewhere along the frontier? This large country with the atom bomb was first in space and first in Marxist-Leninist truths; but, according to Peking, they have become soft on capitalism and have perverted the truths of Marx and the correctness of Lenin.⁴ Soviet policies are determined by the Russian army rather than by the Communist Party. After coaxing the North Koreans to carry Communism to the south, when America entered the war Russia left the hot coals for China to pull out of the fire. These fair weather friends failed to help reunify China when they refused to aid Mao in the Taiwan Straits. They have conspired with the United States in India concerning the Kashmir question. They villify Comrade Stalin, dress Lenin's body in the uniform of the Russian army, rattle their rockets uselessly over Berlin, and succumb supinely in Cuba. The Communist world under Russian leadership has crumbled, with Albania splitting away and Yugoslavia vacillating between capitalism and revisionism. East German, Polish, and Hungarian riots demonstrate the sterility of Russian policy and the impotence of Soviet arms. Like the United States, Russia too is a paper tiger, not fit to be the repository

⁴Dutt, op. cit., p. 71.

of Communism, not worthy to share the truths of historical materialism, too soft to pursue the manifesto of Marx, too fat to continue the active program of Lenin, too divided internally to give guidance and impetus to the International Communist Party.

A FOREIGN POLICY POTPOURRI

Truly, this is the era when the inevitability of Chinese supremacy, so long held down by colonialism, imperialism, foreign domination, and Russian duplicity, will come forth to achieve an Asia for the Asiatics, an Africa for the "correct" Communists, a world ripe for revolution and war. As World War I brought Communism to Russia and World War II brought Communism to China, so will World War III bring Communism to the rest of the world. "Workingmen of the world, unite! You have nothing to lose but your chains!"⁵

This then appears to be the rationale of Red China's leaders, and this is the world in which they seriously believe to be operating-- they believe in the Communist doctrine: they see conditions ripe for revolution. Each day is anticipated as the one in which the man in the street of both the United States and the USSR may assert himself and overthrow an oppressive government. China must be ready to assume her role as the world leader, but until that day comes she will stir up unrest wherever she has sufficient power.

As of this writing, she is concentrating on Latin America, Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. These actions are in

⁵Karl Marx, 'The Communist Manifesto,' p. 75.

accord with China's announced policy which states,

When the U.S. aggressors are hard-pressed in one place, they have no alternative but to loosen their grip on others Everything is divisible, and so is this colossus of U.S. imperialism. It can be split up and defeated. The peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other regions can destroy it piece by piece; some striking at its head and others at its feet.⁶

Red China's global policy appears to be a divisive one directed against the United States, but it is an expensive one as far as China's limited resources are concerned. Any overt action in our area of interest would require resources which Peking finds more profitable if directed to other areas of the world. Therefore, we do not find a dynamic Red Chinese policy, but a conservative one of building favorable political climate for Chinese Communism.

In North Korea, China holds her own with Russia, continues as Korea's ally, and maintains an aggressive policy of watchful waiting--strengthening the Communist Party and attempting to embarrass the United States wherever possible: for example, the Korean-Japanese Treaty.⁷

In the Taiwan area, Communist China maintains an alert defense against reconnaissance and infiltration by the Nationalists. The People's Liberation Army does not have the capability of conducting successful operations against Taiwan. Communist China's main

⁶Lin Piao, op. cit., p. 26.

⁷Glen D. Page, Communism and Revolution, The Strategic Uses of Political Violence, Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, editors, p. 237-238.

efforts consist of attempts to marshal world opinion in her favor as the legal government of China to include Taiwan.⁸ Peking's leaders have been so truculent that they failed to secure the necessary vote in the United Nations to permit them to occupy China's seat in New York. Her policy toward Taiwan seems to be one of bellicose waiting for Chiang Kai-shek to die. Perhaps then, security will relax to the extent that successful infiltration and insurgency operations can be conducted on Taiwan, and world opinion will favor Peking by recognizing it as the legitimate government of China.

In relations with Japan, China's leaders have concentrated on economic, psychological, and political activities but have not so far proved capable of coordinating their efforts. They have confused short-term gains with long-term objectives and have consequently been so aggressive that they have alienated the target country or a major segment of its population. The Trade Mission to Japan is an excellent example; recent actions in Indonesia is another.

Even though the setbacks that Communist China has suffered because of these mistakes could weaken her ability to wage economic and political warfare, we must not forget that they could also result in a more astute strategy in the future.⁹

⁸Union Research Institute, Communism in China, p. 218.

⁹Yuan-li Wu, op. cit., p. 228.

THE POSSIBILITIES FOR DISSENSION

Where in our area of concern are conditions which the Chinese could use to further their aims?

In South Korea, the recent Korean-Japanese Treaty can be made to become a hated document forced on both governments by the Americans. Now South Korean boys are dying in Vietnam. Why should Asian fight Asian in America's war? The South Korean government is a tool of America; it takes taxes from the workers and peasants to support an Army which is used to kill other Asians; Army recruiters shanghai boys off the farm and ship them far away over the seas to fight America's wars against Korea's Asian brothers in Vietnam. American capitalists encouraged and financed the rebirth of the Japanese militarists by producing war material in Japan, but as soon as Japan and Korea bowed to U.S. pressure and signed their treaty the United States announced that it would force American industry to produce a million uniforms--an item previously purchased in Japan. America can't be trusted! Now, America uses Japan, Hong Kong, Okinawa, South Korea, and Taiwan as bases for air and naval units to wage war against those Asians who have just won their freedom from the French, only to become victims of American interference in the internal affairs of their nation. Asia for the Asiatics, not for bases for American imperialism and colonialism!

In Taiwan, Red China could have a fertile field in which to work if she penetrated the native Taiwanese element of the Nationalist Army. Why should the Taiwanese be forced to serve as soldiers

in an army in which they cannot become leaders, not even junior leaders? Why should Taiwan taxes and resources be committed to a defense establishment whose avowed aim and purpose is to return to the mainland at the expense of the blood of Taiwan's youth, of the treasure of Taiwan's mines, mills, and factories under the autocratic control of a lost and dying generation of defeated Chinese leaders from whom even their own countrymen have turned away? A war between Asian and Asian can only help American imperialism, not Asian nationalism.

In Japan, China will meet her greatest problem, but there are areas ready for exploitation by Chinese propagandists and politicians. These areas center around two fundamentals of Japanese political and economic philosophy. First, Japanese trade with mainland Asia for raw materials, foodstuffs, and petroleum imported into Japan and Japanese-manufactured goods exported as foreign trade; and second, Japanese dreams of an Asiatic empire. The Chinese could make headway by its common goals with the Japanese Communist Party and the Socialist Party. Red China can continue to embarrass the government for its closeness to America. The policy makers in Peking could use their nuclear bombs as effective instruments of blackmail against a defenseless Japan. By using as leverage the overseas Chinese who abound as the merchant and small business class throughout the Far East, the rulers in Peking have an instrument to boycott the sale of Japanese goods throughout the Asiatic trade area.

Red Chinese intrasigence toward the United Nations is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is in reality only an extension of the battle waging or to be waged in our area of concern, as well as in South Asia, South and Central America, in Africa, and in the Middle East.

How best can the United States and other nations of the world exist on a common globe with a truculent China--ignorant and unexposed to twentieth century modernity, with an almost fanatical desire to revive, encourage, and sponsor 18th and 19th century revolutions?

For most African leaders at this stage, Peking's appeals for revolution sound anachronistic. They have won their independence. Now they seek stability in order to get on with nation-building and economic development.

Moreover, revolution has an ominous ring to many African leaders, who foresee themselves as the "bourgeois nationalists" who will be scrapped once Peking's timetable calls for power by the proletariat. Several of these leaders have already observed that Communist Chinese support for their regimes has not inhibited Red Chinese attempts at subverting their governments.¹⁰

It is in this atmosphere that America can make the most headway. Perhaps a Communist China in the United Nations would become more exposed to the world as it is today; imperfect as it is, it is a

¹⁰ Stanley Karnow, "China Meets Rebuffs in African Ventures," Washington Post, 7 Jan 1966, p. A13.

far better, modern, patient, and tractable one than is envisioned by Mao Tse-tung et al.

The people of the world must use every opportunity to educate Communist China's present leadership and its successors to actual conditions in this modern world, to assure China that as long as she subscribes to customs acceptable among nations she has little to fear from the United States, to induce her to use her energies, talents, and resources to advance the economic status of her people.

CHAPTER 7

Fear not going slowly.
Fear only standing still.
--Chinese proverb

PORTENT FOR THE FUTURE

What does the future hold for China and her relationship to the world community of nations, and in particular to South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan?

In summary, it is believed that the greatest problem existing between China and the world of which Korea, Japan and Taiwan are a part is the fact that China and her leaders are living in the past, drawing value judgments from a well of ignorance. China's international relations have been established on a foundation of false assumptions whose judgments are based on the 19th century world and whose sterile philosophy is of the same period. This drawing of invalid conclusions may also be a major deterrent to a better understanding between China and the USSR. The Soviets pit their policies against current reality while the Chinese, like Sancho Pancho, joust with windmills.

China should continue to strengthen her relationship with North Korea. Cooperation between these two nations is consistent with the vital interests of China because Korea acts as a buffer state along China's northeastern border. The continuation of a China-oriented government in North Korea would deny Japan access

to the mineral and industrial wealth of northeast Asia. A North Korean Communist Party, controlled by or in sympathy with Peking, can provide a springboard for covert activity directed against South Korea and would probably dominate any coalition government of a unified Korea.

Red China's policy toward Japan will probably be one of continued trade on an unofficial basis with recurring efforts to elicit recognition from the Japanese government. Peking will attempt to continue her domination of the Japanese Communist Party and should try to maintain a unity of purpose and comity with the Socialist Party. Social, cultural, educational, and technical exchange visits will be encouraged and used to further China's desire for diplomatic recognition and increased trade. Failing this goal, China will no doubt opt to create trouble between Japan and the United States in the hope that the Socialists will take over the government.

Peking's relations with the Nationalists on Taiwan will probably continue as at present with her major campaign a political one to be waged in the United Nations. Whether Communist China would agree to UN membership with Taiwan becoming a new state would probably depend on what other advantages she could gain by such an action. Solution to this problem in the UN is also dependent on the United States and what concessions she might be prepared to make in the face of a world consensus. For the time being, Peking will continue to secure her coastline against infiltrators and to protect her airspace against conventional aerial observation

conducted by the Nationalists from Taiwan. Peking will continue her nuclear weapons development program and will attempt to accrue every psychological and propaganda advantage possible therefrom.

While China's policies, with respect to every nation, is beyond the scope of this paper, it is realized that her foreign policy is not limited to South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. China is now a power to be reckoned with on a global basis; therefore, it is necessary to construct a projection of probable courses of Chinese actions and policies toward other segments of the international community.

China will probably give the highest priority to actions in the Third World because it is here that she stands to make the most dramatic gains. She will attempt to dominate local Communist parties; she will support Popular Front activity, and, if possible, encourage movements of national liberation.


In her relations with the Western world, she will be guided by any action that can weaken or embarrass the United States. She will continue her contacts with France and perhaps secure assistance or advice in her nuclear energy and weapons production. Peking will be most careful in her relations with those countries from whom she buys wheat, and in all probability she will attempt to arrange long-term credit for grain purchases. Peking will attempt to gain recognition and support within the Communist parties in western nations.

Sino-Soviet relations will probably continue to deteriorate, with China using every tool to separate Russian leadership and the

Russian people. This is mandatory, because if China is to become the mentor of Communism, she must capture the Communist Party from Russian leadership. Peking will continue to encourage divisiveness within the Communist Bloc.

If China continues to be cautious, overcomes her fear of foreigners, and acquires an understanding of the world in which she lives, there is an acceptable future for China in her relations with the world community.

Perhaps this solution was arrived at because of the grave consequences resulting from any other, now that man holds in his hands the power to abolish all human life. In these same hands, however, is held also the capability of abolishing poverty, hunger, and ignorance. The world has changed since Marx wrote his Manifesto; some method must be found to demonstrate this fact to Red China's leaders. It cannot be done by isolating them or by denying them international intercourse. Every effort must be made to insure that Communist China turns her primary attention inward toward self-improvement--not outward toward self-destruction.


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